Kerberos removes a common security threat, so why isn't it in use on
every network? For several reasons, Kerberos may be difficult to
implement:
No quick "script-o-matic" solution exists for migrating user
passwords from a standard UNIX password database to a Kerberos
password database. Migration is technically feasible, but
conversion scripts aren't provided with Kerberos. See the Kerberos
FAQ Question 2.23 for more detailed information on this
issue.
For an application to use Kerberos, its sources must be modified to
make the appropriate calls into the Kerberos libraries. For some
applications, this may require too much programming effort. For
other applications, changes must be made to the protocol used
between network servers and their clients; again, this may require
too much effort. Furthermore, it may be impossible to make certain
closed-source applications work with Kerberos.
Finally, if you decide to use Kerberos on your network, you must
realize that it is an all-or-nothing proposition. If
any services that transmit plaintext passwords
remain in use, passwords can still be compromised, and your network
gains no net benefit from the use of Kerberos. To secure your
network with Kerberos, you must either
kerberize (i.e., make it work with Kerberos)
all applications that send plaintext passwords
or stop using those applications on your network.